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The 1980's have been marked by enormous swings in the real US dollar exchange 
rate. Starting in the third quarter of 1980 the real dollar appreciated during 16 
out of the 18 subsequent quarters leading to a cummulative real rise of almost 40 
percent. The turning point, which came in Febuary 1985, was followed by a period 
of steady depreciation which has lasted more than two years. Depending upon the 
particular real exchange rate index chosen, between 75 and 100 percent of the real 
appreciation had been reversed by second quarter 1987. 
This dollar cycle, the magnitude of which is entirely unprecedented by 
post-war experience, has had rather puzzling effects on import prices. 
Historically, movements in the real exchange rate have been passed through 
approximately one-for-one to the real price of imports. The rising dollar of the 
first half of the 1980s did lead to lower real prices of imported goods, however, 
the two-year fall in the exchange rate has lead to only a slight increase in the 
real import prices. This puzzling behavior is interesting in itself. It takes on 
added importance, however, in that the slugglish rise of import prices has 
contributed to the persistence of the US trade deficit. 
The failure of import prices to rise has been frequently noted in the business 
press. The usual explanation offered is that import prices have not risen in the 
face of the falling dollar because foreign firms have been cutting profit margins. 
This, of course, is not by itself an explanation — it is an implication. If costs 
rise and prices don't, profit margins are squeezed. What we need is an economic 
explanation of why foreign firms have found it optimal to not pass the depreciation 
through to higher prices. 
Hysteresis is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary as, "failure of a 
property change by an external agent to return to its original value when the cause 
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of the change is removed". One explanation of the recent behavior of US import 
prices is that the unprecedented magnitude of the dollar cycle has resulted in 
hysteresis. This paper empirically investigates the hypothesis that hysteresis has 
occured in aggregate US non-oil import prices. 
The possibility that large exchange rate shocks induce persistent real effects 
has implications for both the real and monetary sides of international economics. 
For instance if temporary exchange rate fluctuations have persistent trade effects 
then the standard welfare analysis of flexible versus fixed exchange rate regimes 
would have to be re-thought. Indeed, Bean 1987 finds evidence that the 1979-S1 
sterling overvaluation had negative hysteric effects on British export performance. 
Additionallyi Baldwin and Krugman 1986 shows that import hysteresis can 
theoretically lead to exchange rate hysteresis? implying that the long run 
equilibrium exchange rate may be path-dependent. 
On the trade side* hysteresis in imports might strengthen or weaken arguments 
for temporary, cyclical protection. Also Dixit 1987 points out that in hysteretic 
models pricing below long run average cost is a normal? non-predatory response to 
the falling dollar. This casts doubts on the usefulness of the ITCs definition of 
dumping. While these theoretical and policy ramifications of hysteresis are 
interesting, they are not addressed in this paper. 
This paper empirically investigates the hypothesis that hysteresis has occured 
in US aggregate import prices. We review evidence based on standard ad hoc, 
pass-through equations, as well as evidence based on two structural models (the 
beachhead model, Baldwin 1986 and the botttleneck model, Foster and Baldwin 1986) 
which could account for the hysteretic behavior of import prices. 
Briefly, the beachhead model asserts that the prolonged overvaluation prompted 
many new foreign firms to enter the US market (establish marketing "beachheads"). 
Not all of these new firms found it optimal to exit in the face of the falling 
dollar due to supply-side factors (sunk investments) or demand-side factors (US 
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consumers acquiring a taste for imports). The presence of these new entrants led 
to a persistent increase in the degree of competition in the US market for imports. 
The increased competition, in turn, led to lower profit margins. 
The bottleneck model focuses on the existence, and irreversibility, of 
capacity constraints ("bottlenecks") in the marketing, distribution and servicing 
networks of importers. According to the model, importers took advantage of a 
dollar appreciation by expanding capacity and lowering prices. Thus at the peak of 
the dollar cycle, importers were operating at their capacity constraints. The turn 
around of the dollar was not fully passed through to prices since the cost 
increases stemming from the dollar fall were partially offset by an alleviation of 
the marketing bottlenecks. 
The prima facie case for import price hysteresis is presented in the second 
section. Section three considers possible theoretical sources of the shift. The 
next section examines a structural model (the beachhead model, Baldwin 1986) that 
could account for hysteresis. The model is presented and a number of testable 
hypotheses are derived and empirically evaluated. The fifth section considers an 
alternative model (the bottleneck model, Foster and Baldwin 1986) which could also 
explain the puzzling behavior of import prices. The model is presented and then 
tested empirically. A summary of our findings and directions for future work are 
provided in the conclusion. 
A direct test of the beachhead model would require time series data on the 
number of varieties of imported goods and their close substitutes, as well as a 
functional form for the dependence of the demand elasticity on the number of 
varieties. Direct testing of the bottleneck model would require data on 
distribution capacities. These tests are most likely to be fruitful on industry 
level data. 
It is our intention here to focus on aggregate macro data. This choice may be 
justified on two grounds. First hysteresis in aggregate import prices could be 
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part of the explanation of the persistence of the US trade deficit. It is 
therefore useful to test the hypothesis carefully on aggregate data. Secondly* it 
would be convenient to have a simple micro explanation of the puzzling behavior of 
aggregate import prices. 
To sum up the results? we find strong evidence that the pass-through 
relationship has shifted in the 1980s. Examination of the time pattern of the 
forecast errors and the residuals of standard pass-through equations? in addition 
to formal structural break tests? lead us to this conclusion The shift? however? 
is also consistent with a long-lived but not permanent change in the pass-through 
relationship. A hysteretic shift is one that persists after the cause of the shift 
has been removed. Since by many calculations the real dollar was still overvalued 
by 10-30 percent in mid-1987 (Krugman and Baldwin 1986)? it is perhaps too early to 
distinguish between long lags and true hysteresis. 
Evidence on the two structural models of hysteresis is less decisive. While 
the the evidence provides some prelimary support of both models? which model looks 
better depends upon which real exchange rate measure is used. The beachhead model 
does better on a measure based on wholesale prices. The bottleneck model does 
better on a consumer price based measure. We conclude that neither model can 
explain all the data? however both are likely to be part of any complete accounting 
of import price behavior. 
2. The Prima Facie Case for Hysteresis 
Before turning to structural models or formal econometrics? we examine some 
informal arguments for a shift in the pass-through relationship. The simplest and 
perhaps most convincing case for the shift can be made by comparing the movement of 
exchange rates and import prices during the pre- and post-1980 periods. A graphic 
way of doing so is to use the historical relationship between the exchange rate and 
import prices to forecast post-1980 import prices and then examine the forecast 
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errors. To this end we regress the log of real import prices on the log of the 
real exchange rate and a constant using pre-1981.3 data (this date was chosen since 
it is only one year into the dollar cycle — long before the dollar was generally 
considered overvalued). The estimates are then used to forecast prices through 
1986 and the forecasted values are plotted against the actual import prices. We 
perform this exercise for the various price and production cost measures. The 
results are found in figures 1 through *+. 
The simulated values in figure 1 are generated from the regression of the log 
of the real import prices on the log of the real exchange rate and a constant. 
Specifically the real import price employed is the US GNP deflator for non-oil 
imports divided by the US wholesale price index (WPI) for manufactured goods? and 
the real exchange rate index is the ratio of an import-weighted index of foreign 
manufactured goods WPIs to the US WPI adjusted by an import-weighted nomimal 
exchange rate index. Figure 1 shows that the historical relationship tracks the 
actual import prices relatively well for the first few quarters of the cycle. 
However, starting in mid-198E, the historical relationship overpredicts prices for 
15 consecutive quarters. Figure 1 clearly depicts a primia facie case for 
hystersis. According to the hysteresis interpetation, the unprecedented magnitude 
of the dollar overvaluation (or anticipation thereof) altered the pass-through 
relationship. This shift does not appear to be fading despite the passing of the 
exchange rate shock. 
Figure 1 can be faulted, however, in that it allows for no lags in the 
pass-through relation. Since most researchers include lags of the exchange rate in 
the pass-through relationship, we allow for this possibility in figure £. 
Specifically we repeat the procedure used to produce figure 1 but this time include 
8 lags (quarterly data) of the log of the real exchange rate as regressors. A 
polynominal distributed lag structure is imposed. The results are plotted in 
figure S. Adding in the 8 lags does not change the general conclusions we drew 
6 
from figure 1. Rather the errors become even more pronounced. This may be due to 
the short period of estimation (1977.1 to 1981.3). 
The data used in constructing these figures have many shortcomings. For 
instance the exchange rate index includes only the G-10 industrialized countries? 
leaving open the possibility that the pattern results from the exclusion of the 
newly industrializing countries. Moreover? a significant portion (between 10 and 
20 percent) of the US non-oil imports are commodities, so that a 
manufacturing-based production cost proxy can be expected to perform poorly during 
periods of large commodity price swings. To partially address such concerns, we 
repeat the procedure using an alternative measure of the real exchange rate. 
The next two figures repeat the figure 1 and £ procedure using a real exchange 
rate measure based on foreign consumer prices indices (CPIs). Consumer prices are 
a poor proxy for production costs (since they include non-tradables), however, they 
are availible for a wider range of US trading partners and for longer time periods 
than are wholesale prices. The measure of foreign prices we use here is the 
Federal Reserve Board's foreign production cost proxy, as reported in Helkie and 
Hooper 1986. The proxy is constructed from import-weighted CPIs from the G-10 
countries and eight LDCs (Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, South 
Korea, Philippines and Malaysia). The real exchange rate index is created by 
converting this foreign production cost proxy into dollars using an import weighted 
nominal exchange rate index and dividing by the US GNP deflator. The real import 
price is the non-oil import price deflator over the US GNP deflator. 
Figure 3 shows the simulated pass-through without lags. Here again we see 
that import prices fell with the rising dollar but failed to rise post-1985. As a 
result, import prices are too low in 1986 and the second half of 1987. The shift 
in figure 3 however differs from that in figure 1. Figure 3 indicates that the 
pass-through was muted in that the prices fell somewhat less than expected and have 
risen much less than expected. The inclusion of 8 lags does not change the 
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substance of this conclusion, as figure 4 depicts. What is common to both sets of 
figures is that the rising dollar was passed through to lower import prices, but 
the falling dollar has resulted in very little price rise. 
The results of figures 1 through 4 are not surprising. Out of sample 
predictions are usually increasingly wrong for macroeconomic relationships. An 
alternative is to look at the residuals for regressions run on data from the whole 
period. Figures 5 through 8 correspond to figures 1 to 4 but are run on data from 
the whole period. The regression errors are naturally less pronounced than the 
forecast errors, however the patterns of the residuals are roughly congruent with 
those of the forecast errors. 
In figure 5 the fitted values overpredict in 14 out of the 23 quarters of the 
dollar cycle (1980.3 to 1986.2), including 11 of the last 14 quarters. Allowing 
for lagged exchange rate effects in figure 6 does not change the general pattern. 
Again the fitted values overpredict 14 out of 23 quarters (7 of the last 12). The 
regressions run on CPI based data present a residual pattern similar to those in 
figures 3 and 4. Allowing for lags, the relationship predicts the fall in prices 
during the dollar upswing quite well but fails to account for the slow import price 
rise post-1985. 
While the real form of the pass-through relationship (i.e., real import prices 
and real exchange rates) is preferable frQm a theoretical standpoint, the nomimal 
relationship has been more important in the existing empirical literature. To 
facilite comparison of our results with this literature we regress a nominal 
foreign production cost proxy (based on the CPI data described above) on the 
nominal import prices. The results are found in figure 9. Clearly this figure 
basically confirms the conclusion of the previous eight figures. 
In summary, the time pattern of the forecast errors and regression residuals 
discussed above plainly suggest that there has been a change in the link between US 
non-oil imports prices and the exchange rate. In figures 1, 2 and 5 the error 
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pattern can be interpeted as a once-off shift in the relationship caused by the 
prolonged overvaluation. The hysteresis hypothesis comes through perhaps even more 
starkly for the CPI-based data. However this data seems to indicate that the shift 
coincided with the turn around of the dollar. We take this evidence as sufficient 
to tentatively assert two related stylized facts: 1) import prices fell in 
response to the rising dollar but have risen less than expected in response to the 
falling dollar, and S) import prices in 1986 and 1987 are lower than the historical 
pass-through relation would predict. 
Structural break tests 
We now turn to more formal testing of the hysteresis hypothesis. In a time 
series regression a hysteretic shift in the pass-through relationship will look 
like a structural break. Therefore the next type of evidence we examine is a 
series of likelihood ratio tests for structural breaks. 
Clearly looking for structural breaks in time series data constitutes a very 
blunt test of the hysteresis hypothesis. The break could stem from a wide range of 
causes that have nothing to do with hysteresis. Moreover there is no reason to 
expect hysteresis would imply a once-off shift in the relationship. Nonetheless 
the tests are important in that a failure to find resounding evidence of a 
strucutral break would cast more than a little doubt on the validity of the 
hysteresis hypothesis. In a sense this exercise is nothing more than a 
formalization of the assertion that the regression errors in figures 5 through 8 
are statistically larger in the post-break period than in the pre-break period. 
Table 1 lists the results of likelihood ratio tests for structural breaks in 
pass-through equations. There is no universally accepted standard pass-through 
equation. To account for this, the tests are performed on a variety of fairly 
representative, ad hoc pass-through equations (the exact equations are listed at 
the bottom of the table). Since there are unavoidable data problems, the equations 
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are also tested on a variety of data sets and a variety of data transformations. 
The import prices and exchange rates used in table 1 regressions are identical to 
those used in figures 1 through 8 described above. Lastly since it is not possible 
to formally identify the break point, tests are performed for a variety of break 
points ranging from 1980:3 to 1985:1. 
Table 1 presents strong evidence that a structural break occured in the 
pass-through relationship sometime in the first half of the 1980s. The different 
data types are listed across the top of the table, while the different formulations 
are listed on the left hand side. Every cell of this matrix indicates a 
combination of a pass-through equation and data. In each cell are listed the 
various break points. A double star indicates that the no-break hypothesis is 
rejected at the 99.5 percent significance level. A "na" indicates that the test 
could not be performed. Since every test that could be performed rejected the no 
break hypothesis at the 99.5 percent level, we can be rather confident that 
something has changed in the pass-through relationship in the 1980s. 
As they stand, the two stylized facts from the figures and the structural 
break tests are consistent with hypothesis that hystersis has occured in the macro 
pass-through relationship. While there is certainly room for alternative 
explanations of these stylized facts, the hysteresis hypothesis cannot be rejected 
out of hand as an empirically empty theorizing. Moreover, these stylized facts 
will, perforce, be reflected in any econometric estimation of the pass-through 
relationship. 
3. Possible Sources of Discontinuous Pass Through Behavior 
The last section argued that the relationship between US import prices and the 
exchange rate has shifted sometime in the 1980s. Ignoring lags and aggregation 
problems, the pass-through relationship could shift due to one of three factors if 
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firms operate at the point where expected marginal cost equals expected marginal 
revenue. Rearranging this first order condition, we get the well known 
relationship between marginal costs, c , prices, p, and the perceived demand 
elasticity, e: E(pCl-(1/6) ]>=E(c >, where variables are measured in dollars. The 
dollar denominated marginal cost of foreign firms depend on the exchange rate. We 
can use this relationship to identify the three possible sources. 
The first conceivable source of the shift is a reduction in the cost markup, 
or profit margin, Cl-(1/6)3. Note that the margin depends only on the perceived 
elasticity, €. Consequently a fall in the profit margins must be due to an 
increase in the perceived elasticity. The second source is from the relationship 
between marginal costs and the exchange rate. If the dollar marginal costs of 
foreign firms depend upon the exchange rate in a discontiuous manner then the 
pass-through relationship could be discontinuous. 
The third source of shifts are the expectations themselves. As was clear from 
the figures, the shift in the pass-through relationship has persisted or worsened 
well into 1987. Presumably any expectations based model would assert that foreign 
firms had expectation of the exchange rate level that significantly differed from 
the observed level. While such a explanation seems implausible, it is certainly a 
possibility. We shall not discuss expectations based models here. It is 
worthwhile to note, however, that the figures in the last section suggest that 
firms reacted differently to the final run up of the dollar which many economists 
believe to have been a rational bubble (Gavin 1986). 
**. The Beachhead Model 
The beachhead model has two versions; one concentrates on supply side factors, 
the other on demand side factors. In both versions a large overvaluation (or 
anticipation thereof) prompts the entry of new foreign firms into the US market. 
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The net effect is to increase competition in the US home market for imported goods. 
While the models differ in their accounts of why not all of the newcomers exit with 
the passing of the exchange rate shock, the lasting change in market structure is 
the ultimate source of hysteresis in both models. 
Chamberlain 1933 argued that an increase in the number of varieties availible 
increases the perceived elasticity of demand for each variety. The persistent 
increase in the number of foreign firms therefore entails a persistent increase in 
the demand elasticity faced by foreign firms. This in turn leads to a persistent 
decrease in profit margins. Hysteresis in import prices is the result. While the 
Chamberlain framework is convenient, an increase in the number of firms leads to 
lower profits margins and lower prices in almost any model of imperfect 
competition. Thus any setup that leads to a persistent increase in the number of 
firms is likely to result in price hysteresis. 
Supply-side Hysteresis 
The first version (Baldwin 1986, 1987) relies on the existence of market entry 
costs that are sunk and durable. We assume that the production costs of foreign 
firms are homogeneous of degree one in output and the exchange rate. In addition 
to the direct production costs, firms must incur a fixed cost, F, in order to sell 
in the home market. This cost, which is essentially a market entry cost, is meant 
to reflect the costs of the firm- and market-specific assets that are required to 
sell in a new market. For example F could represent the costs of setting up a 
distribution and service network, of training workers and managers, and of bringing 
the product into conformity with domestic health and safety regulations. While 
some of these costs may be recouped if the firm ceases to sell in the country, some 
of them are likely to be sunk costs. 
Furthermore, we assume that these sunk assets require maintenance. In order 
to continue selling in the home market, firms must incur a fixed maintenance cost, 
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G, in each period. If the maintenance is not done, the sunk asset disappears, 
i.e., the firm exits. For example, if F represents the cost of a brandname 
introduction advertising blitz, G would represent the brandname maintenance 
advertising. For simplicity, we assume that both F and G are incurred in the US 
and so are independent of the exchange rate. It might seem more sensible to assume 
that not all of the sunk asset disappears when the firm exits. In this case the 
re-entry costs would be below the entry costs. This consideration would complicate 
the analysis without providing any compensating insight. 
In an imperfectly competitive world with these sunk and durable assets, 
consider the effects of an exchange rate shock. A prolonged overvaluation of the 
dollar would increase the competitiveness and profits of foreign firms. The 
prospect of greater profits would in turn encourage more foreign firms to acquire 
the assets necessary to sell in the US. Because the investment is sunk and 
durable, not all the new entrants will exit when the overvaluation passes. 
Since firms are making intertemporal decisions, the exact nature of firms' 
exchange rate expectations are crucial to the mechanics of the model. Baldwin 1986 
and 1987 consider perfectly anticipated exchange rate overvaluations. This 
assumption is meant to capture the notion that firms may have anticipated a 
prolonged overvaluation of the dollar due to persistent changes in US monetary and 
fiscal policy in 1980. This approach may be criticized in that it fails to allow 
for the stochastic nature exchange rates. 
Baldwin and Krugman 1986 extends Baldwin 1986 by solving the entry problem for 
firms facing an independently and identically distributed < iid) exchange rate. 
Moreover it shows that industry-level hysteresis will result in aggregate 
hysteresis under plausible assumptions, and demonstrates that for a very simple 
exchange rate model hysteresis in imports leads to hysteresis in the exchange rate. 
While the assumption of an iid exchange rate greatly simplifies the problem, 
many economists feel that empirically the exchange rate is best modelled as a 
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random walk (Meese and Rogoff 1985). It is therefore important that Dixit 1987a 
and 1987b solve the entry problem in a framework similar to the beachhead model 
allowing for Brownian motion (continuous random walk) of the exchange rate. In all 
of these models large exchange rate shocks have hysteretic effects. 
In summary, the existence of sunk, market entry assets implies an asymmetry 
between firms' the entry and exit conditions. Due to this asymmetry the entry and 
exit conditions do not uniquely determine the equilibrium number of firms but 
rather a range within which the number of firms must lie in equilibrium. A 
sufficiently large overvaluation (regardless of which stochastic process it 
follows) could shift the economy to an equilibrium with more foreign firms than 
prior to the exchange rate shock. The net effect would be to leave the home market 
structure more competitive. This lasting change in the market structure forces a 
lasting reduction in profit margins. 
Demand-side Hysteresis 
In the previous model the persistent change in the number of firms was due to 
supply side considerations. A large exchange rate shock could also have persistent 
trade effects via a demand side channel. This version of the beachhead model 
relies on imperfectly informed consumers. Suppose that US consumers are uncertain 
about the quality of foreign goods they ha,ve never tried. The economics of such 
goods (so-called experience goods) have been widely studied (Schmalensee 1982, 
Grossman and Shapiro 1986). The effect of this demand structure is that new 
entrants face an initial period of low demand during which consumers become 
familiar with their product. Suppose furthermore that firms must incur some sunk 
costs in order to sell in the US. In this framework, a firm will enter the 
domestic market only if it anticipates that the discounted sum of operating profits 
in the introductory and established periods will cover its sunk costs. 
It is easy now to see how this combination of fixed costs and demand structure 
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can lead to hysteresis. An overvaluation means higher operating profits for 
prospective entrants during the overvaluation. Other things equal, this will allow 
more foreign firms to cover the fixed market entry costs. When the overvaluation 
passes? the dollar value of foreign marginal cost rises. However, since domestic 
consumers have tried their products, foreign firms also face higher demand curves. 
Consequently not all of the new entrants will be forced out. 
Essentially the overvaluation plays the role of a costless introductory 
pricing scheme which leads US consumers to become familar with new foreign 
products. This permanent change in the information sets of US consumers implies 
that the market can support a higher number of foreign firms after the 
overvaluation than before the overvaluation. 
Another variation of demand side hysteresis focuses on US retailers rather 
than US consumers. Suppose that US consumers are perfectly informed about the 
quality of foreign goods, however US retailers are imperfectly informed about 
consumers' tastes for new goods. If there is a fixed cost to retailing a new 
product, then this version becomes isomorphic with the experience-goods model 
discussed above. The difference is in that here, the overvaluation induces the 
retailers and not the consumers to learn. 
In both versions of demand side hysteresis, an exchange rate shock may cause a 
persistent increase in the number of varieties of imported goods which in turn 
induces a persistent reduction in profit margins. 
Testing the Beachhead Model 
Before turning to the data directly, we first review some relevant existing 
empirical literature on pass-through behavior. The beachhead model is comprised of 
two assertions: first that an exchange rate shock can alter the US market 
structure faced by foreign firms, and second that market structure affects the 
pricing behavior of foreign firms. While there are no direct empirical 
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investigations of the first assertion, there have been several studies done on the 
second. Dornbusch 1986 is the seminal article. In that paper he uses 
dissaggregated macro data and some industry data to argue that market structure 
affects pass-through behavior. 
Mann 1986a, 1986b and 1987 as well as Feinberg 1986 and Foster 1986 examine 
pass-through behavior by industry. These studies generally support the second 
assertion of the beachhead model. Feinberg finds weak evidence of a negative 
relationship between industry concentration and price responsiveness to the 
exchange rate. He finds somewhat stronger evidence of an inverse relationship 
between price responsiveness and the capital-sales ratio. Foster finds that 
pass-through elasticities have been falling in most industries throughout the 
1980s. Mann's work points out 1) that pass-through behavior differs greatly across 
industries and 2) that the extent of the shift in the pass-through relationship 
during the 1980s dollar cycle also differs across industries. Mann does not 
formally link these differences to industry characteristics. However she notes 
that the shift was greatest in industries where the industry-specific real exchange 
rates moved the most, lending general support to the thesis that the dollar cycle 
itself was responsible for the shift in the pass-through equation. 
Some Testable Implications 
The first implication of the beachhead model concerns the timing of the shift 
in the pass-through relationship. Whether we model the exchange rate process using 
the perfect foresight, iid or random walk assumption, we come to the conclusion 
that the new entrants should have started entering sometime during the dollar 
upswing. Consequently we can write: 
Hypothesis 1: Profit margins should have begun falling sometime between 1981 and 
1985. 
Assuming that firms act as if the exchange rate is iid or a random walk, then 
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entry and the attendent fall in the profit margins should have ceased with the 
dollar turn around. Thus the profit margin should follow an S-shaped curve with 
the first curve coming early in the dollar rise and the second curve coming with 
the dollar turn around. If firms had perfect foresight of the exchange rate, all 
firms that were going to entry would do so as quickly as possible. This implies 
that the profit margins should have stopped falling sometime in the rising phase of 
the dollar cycle. Lastly if firms' expectation of the exchange rate were formed 
adaptively they might have continued entering even after the turn around. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that adaptive expectations would be formed using the current 
and no more than 8 lags (quarterly data) of the exchange rate. Summing up the 
implications of each of these models? we note: 
Hypothesis 5: Profit margins should have stopped falling no later than early 1987. 
Examining figures 1 through 8 provides contradictory evidence on hypothesis 1 
and 2. The figures based on the manufacturing HPI data? especially figures 1 and 
2, tend to confirm the hypotheses. The historical pass-through relationship begins 
to overpredict in the early 1980s as we would expect if profit margins shrunk. The 
relationship seems to shift slowly until the end of 198^ or early 1985 and then 
stops shifting. This tends to confirm hypotheses 1 and 2. 
The CPI based figures? however, tend to indicate that the beginning of the 
shift occurs with the turn around of the dollar. In figure 4, for instance, it 
appears that the shift begins in early 1985 and continues to widen into 1987. This 
pattern tends to refute the hypotheses. 
Testing for Parameter Constancy 
More formally we can test hypotheses 1 and 2 by testing for a parameter shift 
in a pass-through equation. In order to have confidence in our formal testing 
however we must have a model of the pass-through relationship in which the 
perceived demand elasticity (and therefore the profit margin) is identified. The 
17 
ad hoc equations discused in table 1 do not meet this requirement; ad hoc equations 
are useful in testing for structural breaks but not in testing for specific shifts 
in structural parameters such as e. In particular there is no microeconomic 
justification of the lags in the ad hoc equations. We cannot therefore be sure of 
the relationship between the point estimates and €. 
A Micro Model of Lags in the Pass Through Equation 
In the appendix we formally derive a pass-through equation in which lagged 
responses and expectations are explicitly accounted for. In the model 
monopolisitic foreign firms are faced with a delivery lag. The production decision 
occurs at the beginning of period t before the realized value of the exchange rate? 
e,, is known. Moreover, we assume that output produced in period t does not reach 
the market until period t+n. The problem of the firm is to choose production in 
each period in order to maximize the expected present discounted value of profits. 
Clearly firms will produce at the point where the discounted expected marginal 
revenue in period t+n equals expected marginal costs in period t. Aggregating 
across firms (which face delivery lags of various lengths) produces a pass-through 
equation in which today's import price index depends on past exchange rates. The 
pass-through equation we estimate is (see appendix for notation): 
The constant term (the first term on the right hand side of the equation) is 
the parameter we are most interested in. As (1) shows, the constant term is 
proportional to the average profit margin. The profit margin of a firm j, 
a3 
(1 - l/ehm}l 
, depends upon the perceived demand elasticity faced by the firm, 
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€*J. According to the Chamberlain assertion, this elasticity is a function of the 
number of firms in the industry? m,. The beachhead model predicts that this number 
can be changed by an exchange rate shock. To allow for this m. has a time 
subscript. The appendix gives the exact definitions of ft , <x., u , A as well as P 
and C. . 
The perfect foresight assumption implies that m should jump up in the early 
1980s, forcing up eJ at the same time. In equation (1), this jump would look like 
a once-off decrease in the constant term. Table 2 presents estimates of the 
delivery lags equation allowing for an intercept dummy beginning at a variety of 
points between 1980.3 and 1985.1. Equations are estimated allowing for a maximium 
lag of 3, h or 5 quarters (i.e., N=3, 4 or 5). The equation is run on both the 
CPI-based and WPI-based marginal costs proxies. 
Table 2 shows that in most cases the estimated constant term (and therefore 
the profit margin) falls as predicted. In five cases the constant term increased 
after the break point but the increase is significant in only one case. This 
observed fall in profit margins is consistent with the implications of the 
beachhead model (NB: we expect type-1 errors once in 20 tests). Table 2 can 
therefore be said to provide support for the model. It is important to note, 
though, that such a drop in the estimated constant term is consistent with a large 
number of alternative models. In other words, this test of the beachhead model has 
very little power against alternatives. As always, all we can say is the data is 
not inconsistent with the model. 
Table 2 may be critised for restricting the profit margin shift to be of the 
once-off type. Given the heterogeneity of industries and the possibility of other 
expectations processes, it might seem more sensible to allow the profit margin to 
shift over time. To allow for this, we estimate equation (1) with N=3 allowing the 
profit margin to vary over time according to a fifth order polynominal (a fifth 
order polynominal allows for a close fit of the S-shaped time path of the profit 
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margin predicted by a random-walk exchange rate process). Thus we estimate 
3 5 
log(P )= k + Z p1log(C ) + u , where k = c + Z aJ(time)J. This is estimated on 
1=0 j=l 
both the CPI and the WPI data. The resulting time path of k (which is proportional 
to the log of the average profit margins) are plotted figures 10 and 11 from 1977.1 
to 1986.2. In both figures the profit margins are still shrinking in 1986, which 
presumably implies that the market was becoming increasingly more competitive even 
into 1986. 
While these time paths are not directly inconsistent with hypotheses 1 and 2, 
they are somewhat detrimental to the beachead model. The model predicts a close 
tie between profit margins and the number of firms. The conclusion that foreign 
firms were continuing to enter the US well into 1986 is somewhat contrary to the 
anecdotal evidence in the US business press. 
Implications for the Import Volume Equation 
While the presentation of the beachhead model stressed the impact of the 
dollar cycle on the import pricing equationj the model also has implications for 
the import demand equation. For instance, we might expect that the increased 
number of varieties might shift out the aggregate import demand equation 
synchronous with the pass-through shift. Unfortunately, it is not possible to make 
strong predictions since the implications for the volume equation are very 
sensitive to modelling issues. 
To take an example, consider a market with homogeneous goods and Cournot 
behavior. In this case the first order condition of the firm is: p - (—-,—=-;—)d 
where p, S, and c are the price, market share and dollar marginal cost of a typical 
foreign firm. In this setup the entrance of additional firms decreases S and so 
leads to lower profit margins but it does not affect the demand curve. We should 
therefore not anticipate that a persistent change in market structure would cause a 
so 
shift in the relationship between relative prices? income and the volume of imports 
at an industry level. If most industries approximate this structure? then we 
should not expect a shift in the aggregate volume equation. 
On the other hand? if we modelled the industry demand structure with the 
Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model the industry wide demand equation depends upon the 
number of firms as well as price and income. Clearly this model would lead us to 
expect an aggregate demand shift synchronous with the price equation shift. This 
leads us to conclude that the beachhead model makes no strong predictions about 
shifts of the volume equation. What we can say is: 
Hypothesis 3: If there is a shift in the volume equation, it should be synchronous 
with the pass-through shift, and it should cause the historical relationship to 
underpredict import volume. 
Figure IS shows the regression residuals from a standard non-oil import volume 
equation. The log of import volume is regressed on the log of US GNP and the log 
of current and 8 lagged values of the import prices relative to the GNP deflator 
(the real price lags are constrained by a third order polynomial distributed lag 
structure). Figure IS seems to indicate that there has been no shift in the 
aggregate import demand equation. 
5. The Bottleneck Model 
The second model we considered is the bottleneck model (Foster and Baldwin 
1986). This model focuses on a different aspect of marketing, distribution and 
servicing assets. As in the beachhead model we assume firms must incur some market 
entry costs. Examples of such costs are distribution networks, training of sales 
and service personnel and establishment of service centers. In the long run it 
seems reasonable that these marketing and distribution assets are fully adjustable 
and subject to constant returns to scale. However we might expect that not all of 
the factors involved in distribution are . instantaneously adjustable. That is to 
ai 
say firms face a distribution capacity constraint (marketing bottleneck) in the 
short run. 
With constant returns in the long run but some factors fixed in the short run, 
firms clearly faces diminishing returns in the short run. Moreover since the 
diminishing returns stem from the fixity of distribution capacity, we might expect 
that the diminishing returns occur only at levels of sales that exceed capacity. 
An extreme version of the capacity constraint, which is common in the 
industrial organization literature (e.g. Dixit 1980), is depicted in figure 13. 
Here firms are asssumed to have a constant marginal cost of production and 
distribution and a constant marginal costs of capacity expansion. The result is a 
step function for total marginal costs where the discontinuity occurs at capacity, 
K. 
The height of the step depends upon the number of periods the firm expects to 
use the additional capacity. If it anticipates using the additional capacity 
forever, the height of the kink is rA, where r is the constant discount rate and A 
is the unit expansion cost. For shorter usage periods, the height will be greater. 
Prices and costs are measured in dollars in figure 13. An exchange rate 
appreciation will therefore shift down the marginal cost curve but not will not 
affect the marginal revenue curve. 
If the exchange rate appreciates enough, firms will be led to the point where 
they will choose to expand capacity. Figure 1^ shows this situation. Marginal 
o o 
cost curve mc is drawn so that it corresponds to the exchange rate e where the 
firm is on the brink of expanding. The price will be p . If the exchange rate 
continues to rise to e' the firm will expand capacity from K to K', shifting the 
marginal cost curve to mc'. As import sales and capacity expand the appreciation 
will be passed through to lower prices in a continuous manner, lowering the price 
to p'. This continuous relationship between the exchange rate and prices will 
cease upon reversal of the appreciation. 
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When the exchange rate depreciates to e'', the marginal cost curve shifts up 
to mc''. Initially the exchange rate rise has no effect since the firm remains 
capacity constrained. In other words* the rise in marginal costs due to the 
depreciation is entirely offset by the diminishing returns. Consequently there 
will be no change in output, and price will remain at p'. It is not until the 
exchange rate rises to a level like e'*' (which corresponds to mc''') that the 
depreciation will be reflected in a higher import price. At e''' the price will be 
p " ' and output will fall to Q"'. 
Plainly, marketing bottlenecks result in discontinuous pass-through behavior. 
Due to capacity constraints, total dollar marginal costs are a discontinuous 
function of the exchange rate. Since the behavior of import prices is governed by 
the equality of marginal revenue and marginal costs, the pass-through of exchange 
rates to import prices is discontinuous. 
The discontinuity predicted by the model is not a simple asymmetry. The 
discontinuity is path dependent. In the figure lh example, a rising dollar led to 
lower prices but a falling dollar did not raise prices (at least initially). 
However, if due to a previous fall in the exchange rate, the firm was starting from 
a situation depicted by mc in figure 15, the asymmetry would be reversed. Here an 
appreciation would be absorbed by the kink (mc' for instance), while a depreciation 
would be passed through (mc'' for instance) to a higher price, p''. 
This firm level reasoning must be modified when addressing aggregate 
relationships. Clearly some firms may face no marketing bottlenecks so in the 
figure l*r example the exchange rate change from e' to e'' would entail a reduced 
aggregate pass-through rather than n£ pass-through. Those firms which are capacity 
constrained should not raise their prices. Those which are unconstrained should. 
This leads us to formulate our next hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4; The shift in the pass-through relationship should involve a period 
of reduced pass-through that starts with the turn around of the dollar. 
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Once the exchange rate falls enough to alleviate all bottlenecks, there is no 
force to mute the pass-through of exchange rates. This gives us: 
Hypothesis 5; The end of the shift is not precisely predicted by the model. 
However once the shift ends? the pass-through elasticity should return to its 
pre-shock level. 
Despite the return of the pass-through elasticity to it original level, hysteresis 
has occured. The irreversible capacity expansion shifts the exchange rate at which 
the bottlenecks will become binding. 
Since the economics of the bottleneck model involves no demand side 
considerations, there is no reason to expect that the import demand equation should 
shift. This conclusion implies : 
Hypothesis 6: There should be no shift in the import demand equation as a result 
of the shift in the pass-through relationship. 
The bottleneck model involves a reduction in the pass-through elasticity while 
some firms are capacity constrained. The net result is a temporary reduction in 
the pass-through elasticity but a permanent shift in the relationship between the 
level of the exchange rate and the level of prices. 
The time patterns of the forecast errors and regression residual shown in 
figures 1 through 8 provides contradictory evidence on hypothesis **. As noted 
above, the shift appears to occur during the rising dollar in the WPI data, but at 
the turn around in the CPI data. Thus the WPI data (especially figure 1 and 2) 
seem to reject hypothesis ^ while the CPI data (figures 3, 4, 7 and 8) seem to 
validate it. The CPI data indicates that the shift is still occuring, so that it 
is too early for evidence on hypothesis 5. 
The evidence in Foster 1987 comes to bear here. Foster finds a pronounced 
trend toward lower estimated pass-through elasticities across time, at least for 
the aggregate pass-through relationship. If we use the bottleneck model to 
interpet Foster's regressions, we find some support for hypothesis 4. 
According to the bottleneck model? there was a structural break in the 
pass-through elasticity beginning in 1985. In particular there was a reduction in 
the pass-through elasticity. If this were true, but a regression were run 
restricting the elasticity to be constant across the whole period? then the 
estimated elasticity would be a complicated weighted average of the two sub-period 
elasticities. When Foster runs regressions on samples starting at progressively 
later dates, he is essentially increasing the weight put on the lower post-1985 
elasticity. While there are alternative explanations for Foster's results, they 
certainty are not at odds with hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 6 is concerned with the impact of bottlenecks on the volume 
equation. As discussed above, figure 12 indicates that there has been no 
pronounced shift in the import volume equation. This is consistent with hypothesis 
6. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper finds strong evidence that the pass-through relationship has 
shifted in the 1980s and that the nature of the shift is not inconsistent with the 
hysteresis hypothesis. Results on specific structural models, the beachhead and 
bottleneck models, are less conclusive. The data tends to support both models, but 
neither by itself can provide a convincing accounting of all the evidence. We 
conclude that we have failed to find a single, simple micro story that can fully 
account for the puzzling behavior of the macro data. As a result we conjecture 
that both models are likely to play a role in any complete accounting of macro 
import price behavior. 
Future Research 
This paper contains a number of lessons for future research. The first 
involves the nature of structural models which might account .for the shift. Any 
S5 
explanation must focus on an economic factor causing firms to find it optimal to 
not pass the depreciation through to higher prices. In particular the business 
press assertion that import prices have failed to rise because foreign firms have 
been cutting profit margins is incomplete. 
The second concerns future empirical work. Clearly more precise tests of the 
structural models require industry level data. Moreover this paper points out that 
hysteresis in import prices involves a lasting change in the parameters underlying 
the equilibrium relationship between import prices and the exchange rate. In a 
time series estimation of the pass-through relationship* this will appear as a 
structural break. If the test statistics are to be meaningful (that is if the 
statistics are to have well defined distributions under the null of hysteresis and 
the alternative of no hysteresis) the estimation equation must allow for structural 
breaks. The exact nature of the structural break should be derived from the model. 
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Appendix - A Delivery Lags model of Lagged Exchange Rate Effects 
This appendix derives the estimation equation of a structural model of the 
pass-through relationship which explicitly accounts for lagged exchange rate 
effects. Delivery lags are a well known source of lagged effects in 
macroeconomics. The model here is simply a straightforward application. We find 
it convenient to work with a differentiated products framework where each firm has 
a monopoly position for its own variety and maximizes profits in terms of dollars. 
This model of lags assumes that firm j faces a delivery lag of n. periods* and 
a stochastic US demand curve. Period t output is assumed to reach the US market in 
period t+n. . The firm chooses sales to the US, y;? » in each period to maximize the j * 
discounted sum of expected profits. Consider the case of n.=l. The problem of 
firm j is: 
00 
where P, . and cf are the dollar price in period t+1 (this depends on y, ) and the t+1 t t 
marginal cost (which depends on the exchange rate) respectively? and R is a 
constant discount factor, (l/(l+r)). Adopting fairly standard macro notation for 
expectations (e.g., x . is the expectation of x formed at time t-1) the typical 
Euler equation for this problem is: 
where eJ is the constant demand elasticity faced by firm j. We have assumed 
R(l-l/eJ) is non-stochastic. If different firms face delivery lags ranging from 
€ 0j 
zero to N periods, the aggregate import price index (P = 77 CP. • , ] where t is 
^ ^ t t t-n. 
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the number of firms and 0J is firm j's weight in the index) will be: 
where cf is firm j's dollar marginal cost in period t-n . Note that n is 
t-n. j j 
J 
firm-specific and ranges from zero to the maximium delivery lag length, N. 
Taking logs of (*t) produces: 
-n 
where in the last term we have grouped firms according to the length of their 
delivery lag, i.e., ?. is the set of firms with a delivery lag of i periods. The 
parameter ex is the sum of the 6 s of the firms with delivery lags equal to i, so 
<xl = Z £ j . 
Equation (5) depends crucially on unobservable expectations. To implement (5) 
empirically we must specify the expect ions process in terms of observable 
variables. To this end we assume firms have rational expectations in the sense 
that while their expectations may be incorrect, their expectational errors have a 
mean of zero and are uncorrelated with every thing that was in their information 
set when they formed the expectation. 
This assumption allows us to specify the expectations in terms of observables 
and at the same time gives us a theory for the time series properties of the error 
term. Specifically, replacing P (the expectations) with the values actually 
realized, we get: 
SB 
where C . is an index of individual firm's marginal costs. 
t-i 
Using reasoning that is fairly standard in macro econometrics? the assumption 
of rationality makes the stochastic properties of u easy to establish. Clearly u 
has an expectation of zero, and ECu^u, .> =0 for all i > N. However E{u,u. . }?*0 r
 t t-i t t-i 
for i < N, due to the presence of overlapping expectational errors. In other 
words? u follows a order-N moving average process. 
It is important to note that u is not orthogonal to the contemporary 
regressands, so we must instrument. The assumed rationality provides us with a 
large set of instruments. Any variable that was in the information set of firms 
when the expectations were formed is orthogonal to u^. Thus we have E(u,X^ . >=0, 
t t t-i 
for all i > N, where X^  . is the set of the publicly available variables at time 
t-i 
t-i. 
If we use indices for P and C which are proportional to the true indices, 
i.e., P'= 5 P L and C'= v CT, then (5) becomes: t t t t 
where h is the ratio of v to <S. Clearly P' must be the real price of imports since 
demand equations depend on relative prices, and C must be a measure of real 
marginal costs measured in the same units as P'. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Carmen Reinhart pointed out that the NIA non-oil price deflator is a variable 
weight index, while the CPI and WPI cost proxies are fixed-weight indicies. Since 
the composition of US imports has been changing, part of the divergence between 
actual and forecasted may be due to aggregation problems. This cannot be the whole 
explanation since Mann's work shows that even industry level pass-through equations 
(where compositional changes are absent) have shifted. 
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Figure l:Forecast errors of pass through equation using WPI 
data with no lags, estimated on pre-1981:3 data. 
Figure 2:Forecast errors of pass through equation using WPI data 
with 8 lags, estimated on pre-1981:3 data 
Figure 3.'Forecast errors of pass through equation using CPI data 
with no lags, estimated on pre-1981:3 data. 
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Figure 4:Forecast errors of pass through equation using CPI data 
with 8 lags, estimated on pre-1981:3 data. 
Figure 5: Regression residuals from pass through equation using WPI 
data with no lags (estimated on 1975:1-1986:2) 
Figure 6: Regression residuals from pass through equation using WPI 
data with 8 lags (estimated on 1975:1 - 1986:2) 
Figure 7: Regression residuals from pass through equation using CPI 
data with no lags (estimated on 1967:1 - 1987:2) 
Figure 8: Regression residuals from pass through equations using CPI 
data with 8 lags (estimated on 1967:1 - 1987:2) 
Figure 9: Regression residuals from pass through equation based on 
nominal import prices and nominal foreign costs (1967:1-1987:2). 
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Figure 10: Time varying profit margin, CPI data 
Figure 11: Time varying profit margin, WPI data 
Figure 12: Import volume equation, fitted vs actuals 
Figure 13: Monopolistic firm s problem with bottlenecks 
Figure 14: Discontinuous pass through 
igure 15: Reversed Asymmetry in the bottleneck model 
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TABLE 1 - Likelihood Ratio Tests for Structural Break on Reduced Form Equations 
** indicates no structural break hypothesis rejected at 99.5 */• 
na indicates test could not be performed due to near 
singularity in data 
indicates test was not performed 
Helkie & Hooper 
log(p) = c + log(pform) + pdl <log(e),8) + pdl(log(pcom),4) + AR(1) 
pdl indicates that lags were restricted to follow a 3rd order polynomial; 
length of lag follows variable name. 
p is nominal non-oil import price 
pform is an import weighted index of foreign CPI (G-10 and 8 LDCs) 
me is the import weighted nominal exchange rate index 
pcom is a world commodity price index 
first order autocorrelation correction was performed 
Kruoman & Baldwin 
log<p) * c + pdl(l»g<er),8> + ARU) 
pdl indicates that lags were restricted to follow a 3rd order polynomial; 
length of lag follows variable name. 
p is either nominal or real non-oil import price deflator 
er is either nominal or real import weighted exchange rate 
first order autocorrelation correction was performed 
Modified Kruoman & Baldwin 
log(p) - c + log(pform) + pdl (logCer) ,8) + ARU) 
pform is either a CPI or WPI based import weighted index of either real or 
nominal foreign prices 
er is either nominal or real import weighted exchange rate index 
TABLE 5 - Change in Profit Margin at various Break Points 
I indicates that intercept dummy is negative implying that perceived demand 
T 
elasticity increases after break point (i.e., profit margin falls) 
indicates that intercept dummy is positive implying that perceived demand 
elasticity decreases after break point (i.e.? profit margin rises) 
•** indicates no change in constant term hypothesis rejected at 99.5 */• level 
• indicates no change in constant term hypothesis rejected at 95 */. level 
Delivery Lags Pass Through Equation: 
n 
log(p.) * c + dummy + Z 7. log(rer. .) + MA(n), 
* irO 1 t"1 
where p is the real import price, dummy is an intercept dummy starting at 
break point listed, and rer is the real exchange rate at t-i. MA indicat 
that the error was assumed to follow a moving average process of order n. 
